Price, Tobacco Control Policies and Youth Smoking by Frank J. Chaloupka & Michael Grossman
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
PRICE, TOBACCO CONTROL








This paper was presented at the Economics of Substance Abuse II session of the 71st annual
conference of the Western Economic Association International, July 1, 1996, San Francisco, CA.
Support for this research has been provided by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, We are indebted to Robert L. Ohsfeldt for his helpfil
comments, to John Taurus and Junji Zhang fortheir research assistance, and to Patrick O’Malley and
Timothy J. Perry for providing the Monitoring the Future data. This paper is part of NBER’s
research program in Health Economics. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
01996 by Frank J. Chaloupka and Michael Grossman, All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including 0 notice, is given to the source.NBER Working Paper 5740
September 1996
PRICE, TOBACCO CONTROL
POLICIES AND YOUTH SMOKING
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effectiveness of several tobacco control policies in discouraging
cigarette smoking among youths. These policies include increased cigarette excise taxes (which
result in higher cigarette prices), restrictions on smoking in public places and at private worksites,
and limits on the availability of tobacco products to youths, The data employed in this research are
taken from the 1992, 1993,and 1994 surveys of eighth, tenth, and twelfth grade students conducted
by the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research as part of the Monitoring the Future
Project. Site specific cigarette prices and measures of tobacco related policies are added to the
survey data. The results indicate that tobacco control policies can be effective in reducing youth
cigarette smoking. The average overall estimated price elasticity of youth cigarette demand of
-1,313 indicates that large increases in cigarette excise taxes would lead to sharp reductions in youth
smoking. Similarly, strong restrictions on smoking in public places would reduce the prevalence
of smoking among youths, while limits on smoking in schools would reduce average cigarette
consumption among young smokers, However, limits on youth access to tobacco products appear
to have little impact on youth cigarette smoking. This is most likely the result of the relatively weak
enforcement of these laws.
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In the twenty years after the release of the first U.S. Surgeon General’s report on the
health consequences of cigarette smoking in 1964, considerable progress was made in reducing
cigarette smoking in all segments of the population. From 1987 to 1990, the downward trend
in smoking participation among adults accelerated to an average rate double the rate of decline
over the preceding 20 years (Institute of Medicine, 1994). This success was achieved with a
variety of tobacco control policies, including the widespread dissemination of information on the
health consequences of cigarette smoking, broadcast of anti-smoking advertisements, limits on
tobacco advertising, restrictions on smoking in public places and private workplaces, increased
cigarette excise taxes, and various others (USDHHS, 1989).
However, continued reductions in the prevalence of smoking among youths have not been
sustained in recent years. As the recent Surgeon General’s report notes (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (USDHHS), 1994), smoking rates among youths fell sharp]y
throughout the 1970’s. However, during the 1980’s and early 1990’s, the percentage of youths
who are regular smokers has remained relatively stable, with prevalence increasing in some
youth populations (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 1994). These trends,
coupled with the growing evidence on the addictive nature of cigarette smoking (USDHHS,
1988), have led to an increased emphasis on policies to discourage the use of tobacco among
young people. These efforts include increasing (or establishing) the minimum legal purchase
age for tobacco products, restricting the sale of cigarettes through vending machines, limiting
the free distribution of cigarettes to underage youths, and others. Much of this legislation was
1developed at the local level, but with the Synar amendment, the Federal government has
emphasized the importance of reducing the availability of tobacco to youths. This amendment
requires states to clearly demonstrate that they are enforcing laws which prohibit the sale and
distribution of all tobacco products to persons under eighteen years of age.
This paper examines the effectiveness of several tobacco control policies in discouraging
cigarette smoking among youths. These policies include increased cigarette excise taxes (which
result in higher cigarette prices), restrictions on smoking in public places and at private
worksites, and limits on the availability of tobacco products to youths. The data employed in
this research are taken from the 1992, 1993, and 1994 surveys of eighth, tenth, and twelfth
grade students conducted by the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research as part
of the Monitoring the Future Project. This is a particularly interesting age group to study since
it includes youths at a critical point in the initiation of regular smoking. As the recent Surgeon
General’s report concludes, almost all adult smokers first use cigarettes by high school
graduation, while almost no first use occurs after age twenty. Thus, tobacco control policies
which discourage cigarette smoking in this age group may be the most effective way of
achieving long run reductions in smoking in all segments of the population.
II. Selected Review of Econometric Studies of Cigarette Demand
Numerous econometric studies of cigarette demand have been published over the past
2several decades. 1 Most of these studies have used diverse data and methods to estimate the
effects of cigarette prices and taxes on smoking participation and cigarette consumption in the
overall population, One general conclusion emerges: increases in cigarette prices will
significant y reduce cigarette consumption. A recent National Cancer Institute sponsored
gathering of economists and other experts on the impact of cigarette prices on demand concluded
that the overall price elasticity of cigarette smoking fell in the range from -0.3 to -0.5 (NCI,
1993a).
Relatively few of these econometric studies have used individual level data to focus on
the price responsiveness of cigarette smoking among youths and young adults. The first
significant work in this area was completed by hwit and his colleagues in the early 1980’s.
Lewit and Coate (1982) estimate cigarette demand and smoking participation equations using the
1976 Health Interview Survey by age (20-25 years, 26-35 years, and 35-74 years) and gender.
They find that the majority of the impact of price is on the decision to smoke rather than on the
quantity smoked by smokers. In addition, they find that the smoking behavior of young adults
(20-25 years) is more sensitive to price than that of older individuals. They estimate that the
overall elasticity among those 20-25 years is -0.89, with a participation elasticity of -0.74, as
compared to their estimates of -0.42 and -0.26, respectively, for all adults. Finally, they find
that men, particularly those ages 20 to 35 years, are quite responsive to price, while cigarette
smoking among women is unaffected by price.
Lewit, Coate, and Grossman (1981) used Cycle III of the Health Examination Survey
1For comprehensive reviews of these studies, see the
General’s reports (USDHHS 1989, 1994, forthcoming)
1989, 1994, and forthcoming Surgeon
3(HES-111)conducted from March 1966 through March 1970, to look at the effects of cigarette
prices, the negative cigarette advertising under the Fairness Doctrine, and various socioeconomic
and demographic factors on cigarette smoking among 12 to 17 year olds. They estimate
smoking participation equations for all youth as well as cigarette demand equations for youth
smokers. This allows them to distinguish the effect of price on the decision to smoke from its
impact on cigarette consumption by smokers. They estimate that the price elasticity of demand
among youths is -1.44, more than three times as high as it is among adults, and nearly double
that of young adults (ages 20 through 25 years), when comparing their estimates to those of
Lewit and Coate (1982). They find a strong impact of price on the decision to smoke (price
elasticity of -1.20) rather than on average consumption by smokers (price elasticity of -0.25).
These findings are generally confirmed in a related study by Grossman, et al., (1983) which uses
the 1974, 1976, 1977, and 1979 National Surveys on Drug Abuse. They note that estimates
from this study should be interpreted cautiously since sample sizes are relatively small. In
general, they find that the decision to smoke is negatively related to price, with their summary
estimate of this elasticity as -0.76. Again, this estimate is substantially higher, in absolute value,
than that obtained for adults by Lewit and Coate, implying that the decision to smoke by youths
is much more responsive to price than the comparable decision for adults. However, they find
that, once the decision to smoke has been made, average consumption decisions by youth
smokers are virtually unresponsive to price.
Warner (1985) uses the age specific price elasticities of participation and demand from
Grossman and his colleagues to obtain comparable estimates for teenagers ages 18 to 19. He
predicts that the 1983 doubling of the Federal excise tax reduced the number of teenage smokers
4by 800,000. These estimates are the basis for a General Accounting Office report (1989)
concluding that an increase in the Federal tax to 20 cents per pack in 1989 would have cut the
number of teenage smokers by an additional 500,000. The GAO predicts a subsequent reduction
of 125,000 smoking related deaths for this age group as a result of the proposed 20 cent tax
increase. Similarly, based on the work by Grossman and his colleagues, Harris (1987)
concludes that the 1983 doubling of the Federal cigarette tax, and the coordinated price increases
it induced, kept 600,000 teenagers, from starting to smoke.
More recently, Chaloupka (1991) estimated the price elasticity of cigarette demand for
youths and young adul~ (ages 17 through 24) in the context of the Becker and Murphy (1988)
model of rational addictive behavior. Rationality, in this context, implies that the future
consequences of smoking are considered when making current choices. Using data from the
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey II (NHANESII), Chaloupka finds that price
increases significant y reduce cigarette consumption and that their impact is understated if
addiction is ignored. In addition, he finds that less educated (younger) individuals behave more
myopically than more educated (older) individuals, while more addicted (myopic) individuals are
more responsive to price in the long run than their less addicted (myopic) counterparts. Youths
and young adults (ages 17 to 24) are found to be less responsive to price than older groups.
Chaloupka finds that women act less myopically and are less responsive to price than men.
Finally, he finds that restrictions on smoking in public places have a significant negative impact
on average cigarette consumption.
Wasserman, et al. (1991) use several of the Health Interview Surveys from the 1970’s
and 1980’s to examine changes in the price elasticity of demand over time. They find that the
5negative impact of cigarette prices on cigarette demand for adulti has increased over time. In
addition, they use data on youths ages 12 through 17 years taken from NHANESII to look at
the impact of prices and smoking restrictions on youth smoking. Wasserman, et al.’s findings
for youths contradict the general conclusion of Grossman and his colleagues that youth cigarette
smoking is more responsive to price than is adult smoking. Wasserman and his colleagues
estimate a statistically insignificant effect of cigarette prices on average cigarette consumption
among all youths, youth smoking participation, and cigarette consumption by young smokers.
Given their estimates, they cannot reject the hypothesis that the price elasticity of demand for
teenagers is statistically different from their estimate for adults. Wasserman, et al., suggest that
one of the reasons for their relatively low estimate is their inclusion of an index capturing anti-
smoking regulations as a determinant of demand. They find that these regulations, generally
excluded as explanatory variables in earlier studies of demand, are highly correlated with
cigarette prices. They argue that the price effects estimated in other studies may be biased
upwards since prices are also picking up the effects of the anti-smoking regulations. They do
estimate that these anti-smoking regulations have a large negative effect on cigarette smoking
by youths, and that the regulations are most effective in preventing youths from initiating
smoking.
Grossman (1991) notes, however, that the estimates by Wasserman, et al., while an
important contribution, should not be considered the definitive estimates of the price elasticity
of demand, particular y for youths. As Wasserman, et al. indicate, part of the reason for their
relatively low estimates is the inclusion of the regulation index, which is highly correlated with
price. Others, including Chaloupka (1991, 1992), Chaloupka and Saffer (1992), and Chaloupka
6and Wechsler (1995), do not find that the estimated price elasticity of demand is sensitive to the
inclusion of measures of these anti-smoking regulations. Furthermore, including the regulation
index may be inappropriate in their teenage sample, since it assumes its highest value in states
restricting smoking in private worksites. This restriction is unlikely to have any direct impact
on youths since they spend most of their time in school. If the regulations themselves have no
impact on smoking, but are instead proxies for anti-smoking sentiment, then enacting very
restrictive measures will not necessarily reduce youth smoking. Finally, Grossman suggests that
Wasserman, et al.’s findings for their relatively small sample of youths (1,891) should be
interpreted cautiously when compared to those obtained by Lewit, Coate, and Grossman (sample
size 5,308).
More recently, Evans and Farrelly (1995) pooled data from 13 of the National Health
Interview Surveys conducted from 1976 through 1992 to examine the demand for cigarettes by
young adults (ages 18 through 24 years) and adulfi (ages 25 through 39 years and ages 40 and
older). Their findings are consistent with the earlier work by Lewit and Coate (1982) in that
they find that the price responsiveness of cigarette demand decreases with age. The estimate an
overall price elasticity of demand of -0.63 for young adults, approximately fifty percent higher
than the -0.42 they estimate for those ages 25 through 39, Moreover, they find no significant
effect of price on either smoking participation or average daily cigarette consumption for their
oldest sample (40 years and older). In addition, Evans and Farrelly examine the potential for
substitution towards higher tar and nicotine cigarettes in response to increased prices. They do
find this type of price induced compensating behavior, with shifts for young adults large enough
to actually increase tar and nicotine consumption among continuing smoker after a price
7increase, offsetting some of the potential health benefits associated with higher taxes.
Most recently, Chaloupka and Wechsler (1995 and forthcoming) looked at the effects of
prices and restrictions on cigarette smoking among college students, using data taken from the
1993 Harvard College Alcohol Study. Their sample includes 16,277 students in 140 U.S.
colleges and universities. Chaloupka and Wechsler’s findings are consistent with the research
by Lewit and his colleagues. Their estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes
among college students center on -1.11, with an estimated elasticity of smoking participation of-
0.53. In addition, they find that relatively stringent restrictions on smoking in public places
significantly reduce the likelihood that college students smoke, while any restrictions on smoking
lead to reductions in the quantity smoked by smokers.
While numerous studies of the effecti of price on cigarette smoking have been completed
in recent years, a small number of which also examine the impact of clean indoor air laws on
smoking, the impact of other policies related to cigarette smoking, particular y among youths
and young adults, have not been examined using large, nationally representative data. However,
several studies may shed some 1ight on the effectiveness of these policies in discouraging youth
smoking and other tobacco use.
DiFranza, et al., (1987) find that minimum purchase age laws have little success in
reducing minors’ access to tobacco since the laws are poorly enforced. They suggest that
prohibitions on tobacco possession by minors, warning signs at the point of sale, and bans on
vending machines sales could be more effective. Jason, et al., (1991), in their study of
Woodridge, IL, find that youth smoking fell significantly in the city in response to the aggressive
enforcement of a law restricting cigarette sales to minors. Forster, Hourigan, and Kelder
8(1992), in their examination of St. Paul, MN, find that bans on the sale of cigarettes through
vending machines are likely to be more effective in reducing youth access to cigarettes than
requiring locking devices on the machines, since this requirement needs additional enforcement
to ensure compliance. Altman, et al., (1991) find that community wide educational efforts in
Santa Clara County, CA, had sustained success in reducing youth smoking, although some
recidivism occured.
To summarize, the effect of cigarette prices on smoking by youths and young adults is
unclear, although increased prices are expected to reduce their smoking by at least as much as
they do among adults. Similarly, little is known about the impact of clean indoor air laws on
youth and young adult smoking. Finally, the effects of limits on youth access to tobacco,
including minimum purchase age laws, restrictions on vending machine sales, and others have
not been examined empirically in large, nationally representative data. This research addresses
these issues by studying the impact of cigarette prices, restrictions on smoking in public places,
limits on youth access to tobacco, and related policies on smoking participation and average
daily cigarette consumption in a large, nationally representative sample of eighth, tenth, and
twelfth grade students.
III. Data and Methods
The data for this study are taken from the 1992, 1993, and 1994 surveys of eighth, tenth,
and twelfth grade studenfi conducted by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University
of Michigan as part of the Monitoring the Future Project. Every year since 1975, ISR has
9collected a nationally representative sample of 15,000 to 19,000 high school seniors. In 1991,
an annual survey of similar numbers of eighth and tenth grade students was added. These
surveys, described in detail by Johnston, O‘Malley and Bachman (1993) focus on the use of
alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drugs among youths. Given the nature of the data being collected,
extensive efforts are made to ensure that the data collected are informative. Parents, for
example, are not present during the completion of the survey and are not informed about their
child’s responses. By special agreement, a restricted data set with variables reflecting youth
tobacco use and identifiers for each youth’s county of residence was provided. These data also
include a variety of socioeconomic and demographic information.
All respondents were asked about their recent cigarette smoking.z Two alternative
measures of youth cigarette smoking are constructed from the information collected in the
surveys.3 The first measure is a dichotomous indicator of smoking participation equal to one
for youths who report any cigarette consumption in the past thirty days, and equal to zero
otherwise. In addition, based on the midpoints of the categorical responses reflecting average
daily cigarette consumption, a “continuous” measure of daily cigarette consumption was
constructed.4 While not ideal, this continuous measure will be helpful in developing estimates
of the price elasticity of cigarette demand among young smokers.
2 Unfortunately, the surveys did not collect the detailed data on past
needed to estimate demand equations applying the Becker and Murphy (1988)
models of addictive behavior.
cigarette smoking
or other economic
3Average daily cigarette consumption is reported in seven categories for youths indicating
that they are current smokers.
4 A value of 45 was assigned to the open ended category (2 or more packs per day).
Alternative values were also used with no appreciable impact on the estimates. These results
are available upon request.
10Based on the survey data, a variety of independent variables were constructed to control
for other factors affecting cigarette demand. These include: the age of the respondent, in years;
average weekly income from all sources (employment, allowances, and other sources); an
indicator for males; indicators for youths surveyed in 1993 and 1994; an indicator for youths
surveyed in the eighth/tenth grade survey; indicators of race/ethnicity (Black, and other non-
White); an indicator for married or engaged youths; indicators of parental education (less than
high school graduate, and more than high school graduate for mother and father separately);
indicators of family structure (live alone, mother only parent present, father only parent present,
no parent present - live with other(s)); indicators of mother’s work status while youth was
growing up (mother worked part-time and mother worked full-time); an indicator for youths with
siblings; average number of hours worked weekly; an indicator for youths living in rural areas;
and indicators for frequency of participation in religious services (infrequent ptiticipation and
frequent participation).
Based on each respondent’s county of residence, cigarette price and tobacco control
policy data were added to the survey data. The measure of cigarette price is a state level
average cigarette price taken from the Tobacco Institute’s annual Tax Burden on Tobacco. This
price measures is inclusive of state level excise taxes on cigarettes and reflects the average price
for a pack of twenty cigarettes, based on the prices of single packs, cartons, and vending
machine sales, and includes generic cigarettes. 5 To account for changes in relative prices
5 Two additional price series were added to the survey data. The first is also a state level
average cigarette price taken from the Tax Burden on Tobacco, but which excludes generic
cigarettes. The second is a city specific price taken from the American Chamber of Commerce
Researchers’ Association’s quarterly Inter-Citv Cost of Livinz Index and reflects the price of a
carton of Winston king-size cigarettes. The three price variables are highly correlated and
11between 1992 and 1994, the cigarette price, as well as weekly income, was deflated by the
National Consumer Price Index for the first two quarters of the survey year.
A set of tobacco control policy variables was added to the surveys based on each youth’s
county of residence. These variables include measures of state, county and city level restrictions
on cigarette smoking in public places and private workplaces and limits on the availability of
tobacco products to youths,
indicating the fraction of
The restrictions on smoking are captured by a set of five variables
the population in each youth’s county of residence subject to
restrictions on smoking in private workplaces, restaurants, retail stores, schools, or any other
place.
Limits on the availability of tobacco products to youths are measured by several variables
including: the state minimum legal purchase age for cigarettes, an indicator for youths residing
in states requiring signs to be posted reflecting the minimum legal purchase age, and variables
reflecting the fraction of the population in each youth’s county of residence with restrictions on
the sale of tobacco products through vending machines, the fraction in counties limiting the
distribution of free samples of tobacco products, and the fraction in counties requiring licensing
of those who sell tobacco products.
Finally, two additional measures of state tobacco related policies are
is a dichotomous indicator equal to one for states which earmark a portion
included. The first
of the tax revenues
produced very similar estimates.
The Tobacco Institute reporfi prices as of November 1 each year. To obtain an estimate
of the price in the first two quarters of the survey year, since the surveys are conducted in the
spring, the November 1 price, exclusive of state and federal taxes was computed for the survey
year and the previous year. Monthly prices, exclusive of taxes, were estimated based on a linear
interpolation. Average taxes were then added to the average price for the first two quarters of
each year.
12generated by state cigarette excise taxes for other tobacco control activities (including anti-
smoking media campaigns), and equal to zero otherwise. The second is an indicator equal to
one for states which have adopted some form of smoking protection legislation, and equal to
zero otherwise.
Data on state level tobacco control policies were taken from the Coalition on Smoking
OR Health’s (CSH) annual State Legislated Actions on Tobacco Issues. Similar information on
county and city level restrictions was taken from the NCI’s (1993b) monograph summarizing
major local tobacco control policies, updated with information from CSH.
After eliminating respondents with missing or inconsistent data, a sample of 110,717
youths was obtained. Table One contains descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent
variables employed.
Given the limited nature of the dependent variables, ordinary least squares techniques are
inappropriate. Instead, a two-part model of cigarette demand is also estimated based on the
model developed by Cragg (1971). In these specifications, probit methods are used to estimate
a smoking participation equation in the first step. In the second step, least squares methods are
used to estimate average daily cigarette consumption by smokers, where the dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of the continuous average daily consumption measure. The same set of
independent variables is included in both equations.
IV. Results
Estimates of the two-part model for youth cigarette demand are contained in Tables Two
13and Three. Given the large number of policy variables and the high correlations among many
of these variables, two alternative strategies were pursued in estimating the two-part model, In
the first strategy, smoking participation and conditional cigarette demand equations which contain
all socioeconomic and demographic variables, the real cigarette price, and at most one tobacco
related policy variable are estimated. The estimates for the policy and price variables obtained
from this strategy are contained in Table Two,b
coefficients and t-ratios from the two-part model for
Each row in Table Two presents the
cigarette price and the tobacco control
policy variable contained in that specification. Including only a single tobacco control policy
variable in each specification of the two-part model minimizes the multicollinearity resulting
from the inclusion of a large number of highly correlated variables. Omitting the other policy
variables, however, may lead to biased estimates of the effects of cigarette prices and the
included policy variable on youth cigarette demand. The second estimation strategy addresses
this possibility by including all tobacco related policy measures as independent variables in the




variables, cigarette price, and all socioeconomic and demographic variables are
in Table Three. In these specifications, the omitted variables bias is minimized
including the large set of policy variables may result in multicollinearity, making it
difficult to estimate the true impact of these policies on youth cigarette smoking.
a. Tobacco Related Policy Variables
GThe estimates for the socioeconomic and demographic variables from the single policy
specifications are very similar to those contained in Table Three.
14Cigarette price is found to have a negative and statistically significant impact on both
smoking participation and conditional cigarette demand in all specifications. These estimates
clearly show that increases in cigarette prices, which could be achieved by raising cigarette
excise taxes, would lead to sharp reductions in youth cigarette smoking. Moreover, the effect
of increased cigarette prices would not be limited to reductions in average daily cigarette
consumption by young smokers, but would also result from substantial reductions in the
probability that a youth smokes. In general, the estimated coefficients on the cigarette price
variable are relatively stable in the specifications including at most one tobacco related policy
variable. However, when the variable indicating that the youth resides in a state where a portion
of the cigarette excise tax revenues is earmarked for other tobacco control activities is added to
the model (both by itself or when the other policy variables are included), the magnitude of the
price coefficient falls significantly. This is not surprising given that this indicator and cigarette
prices are highly correlated since the earmarking of cigarette tax revenues accompanied several
of the largest cigarette excise tax increases in recent years (most notably those in California,
Massachusetts, and Michigan).
Panel A of Table Four contains the estimated price elasticities of youth cigarette demand
based on the estimates from the two-part models presented in Tables Two and Three. These
elasticities are based on two alternative specifications: the model excluding all other tobacco
related policy measures and the model which includes these variables. The price elasticity of
youth smoking participation is -0.799 in the model excluding the other tobacco related policy
variables, while the conditional demand elasticity from this model is -O.651. Thus, the total
price elasticity of youth cigarette demand is -1.450 in this model. As discussed above, this
15estimate of the price effect is most subject to an omitted variables bias and may be interpreted
as an upper limit for the price elasticity of youth smoking. When all of the tobacco related
policy variables are included, the estimated price elasticity of youth smoking participation falls
to -0.376, with a comparable conditional demand elasticity of -0.470. Thus, the unconditional
price elasticity of youth cigarette demand in this model is -0.846. This estimate, which is likely
to be affected by the collinearity between the price and tobacco control policy variables, may
be interpreted as a lower bound for the true price elasticity of youth smoking.
Substantial differences in cigarette taxes and, consequently, in cigarette prices among
states may lead some youths in relatively high tax/price localities to purchase cigarettes in nearby
lower tax/price localities. Failing to account for this possibility could produce biased estimates
of the price elasticity of demand. As Wasserman, et al., (1991) note, this may be less of a
problem when looking at youth cigarette demand than it is when estimating adult demand given
that many youths are unable to drive legally and, consequently, may have only limited
opportunity to engage in this type of tax evasion. Nevertheless, in an effort to control for this
type of behavior, all equations were reestimated for a “restricted” sample which drops
respondents living in counties within 25 miles of a state with a lower cigarette price. This is
the same approach to the “butt”legging problem taken by Lewit and Coate (1982) and by
Wasserman, et al., (1991). The estimated price elasticities of demand for the restricted sample
are presented in Panel B of Table Four.7 The estimated elasticities for the restricted sample are
higher than those for the full sample. In the model which excludes all other tobacco control
7 Coefficient estimates for the other independent variables from the two-part model for the
restricted sample are generally similar to those presented in Tables Two and Three and are
available upon request.
16policy variables, the estimated participation elasticity is -0.923, while the overall elasticity of
youth cigarette demand is estimated to be -1.702. The comparable estimates of the participation
and total elasticities for the full model are -0.602 and -1.254, respectively.
These estimates indicate that substantial reductions in youth smoking would result from
large increases in cigarette prices. The average of the four estimates, an unconditional elasticity
of -1.313, suggests that the effect of cigarette price increases on youth smoking is about three
times as large as the impact on adult smoking. These estimates imply that approximately half
of the reductions in youth smoking result from a decline in the probability that a youth will
smoke, with the remainder coming from a comparable reduction in the average daily cigarette
consumption of young smokers.
The estimates for the variables reflecting restrictions on smoking in public places are less
consistent. When entered individually, relatively strong restrictions on smoking (those limiting
smoking in private workplaces, restaurants, or retail stores) are found to have a negative and
statistically significant impact on the probability of youth smoking. Less stringent restrictions
(those limiting smoking in schools or any other public place), however, have little impact on
youth smoking participation decisions. When all tobacco related policy measures are included,
the measure reflecting the strongest restrictions on smoking, those limiting smoking in private
workplaces, continues to have a negative and significant impact on the probability that a youth
will smoke, while the others are generally negative, but insignificant. This is not surprising
given the correlation among these different indicators. Taken together, these estimates imply
that relatively strong restrictions on smoking significantlyreduce the probability that a youth will
smoke. This is consistent with the findings of Wasserman, et al. (1991) for youths, Chaloupka
17and Wechsler (forthcoming) for young adults, and Evans, Farrelly, and Montgomery (1996) for
adults.
However, the estimates from the conditional cigarette demand equations suggest that the
relatively strong restrictions on smoking in public places and/or private workplaces have little
impact on average daily cigarette consumption among young smokers. In general, the variables
reflecting strong restrictions on smoking have either a positive or insignificant impact on daily
cigarette consumption by smokers. The variable reflecting restrictions on smoking in schools,
however, is negative and statistically significant in both the model excluding the other policy
variables and the model including all tobacco related policy variables. Of the various
restrictions, the limits on smoking in school are Iikely to be most relevant to young smokers
given the amount of time spent in school by the eighth, tenth, and twelfth grade students
included in the sample.
In general, the variables reflecting the limits on the availability of tobacco products to
youths have little impact on youth smoking. The coefficient on the minimum legal purchase age
for cigarettes is positive and statistically significant in all models, contrary to expectations.
Higher legal purchase ages were expected to increase the difficulty associated with obtaining
cigarettes for underage youths and, consequently, to reduce both the probability that youths
smoke as well as cigarette consumption by young smokers, similar to the reductions in youth
drinking that resulted from higher minimum legal drinking ages (see, for example, the review
by Grossman, et al., 1994). Similarly, the coefficients on the indicator for youths in states
requiring signs indicating the minimum purchase age for cigarettes be posted where these
products are sold is inconsistent across the two models for the two measures of youth smoking.
18These findings are not that surprising given the relatively limited variation in minimum purchase
ages (by 1994 all states had a minimum purchase age of 18 years, with the exceptions of
Alabama, Alaska and Utah where it was 19 years, and Pennsylvania where it was 21 years).
Moreover, numerous studies indicate that these laws are poorly enforced and that, as a result,
sales of cigarettes to underage youths are commonplace (see the 1994 Surgeon General’s report
for a detailed review of this literature (USDHHS, 1994)).
Similarly, the other limits on the availability of tobacco products to youth do not appear
to reduce youth smoking. The coefficients on the variable reflecting restrictions on vending
machine sales of tobacco products (including restrictions on vending machine placement,
requirements for locking devices, and bans on vending machine sales) are positive in the four
models, and significant in the two models of youth smoking participation. As with the minimum
purchase ages described above, several studies suggest that these restrictions are not that well
enforced and generally have little impact unless coupled with education programs, licensing, and
fines (USDHHS, 1994). Moreover, young smokers are relatively unlikely to obtain cigarettes
from vending machines (USDHHS, 1994), suggesting that these restrictions will have a limited
impact on youth smoking at best. The coefficients for the variable reflecting limits on the
distribution of free samples of cigarettes generally have a negative, albeit mostly insignificant,
impact on the two measures of youth smoking. Finally, the variable capturing the state or local
licensing requirements has no statistically significant effect on either measure of youth smoking.
This is not surprising given that many of these licensing requirements provide little in terms of
fines and/or revocation for sales to underage youth, Indeed, only a handful of the state licensing
requirements even specify an enforcer (USDHHS, 1994).
19Taken together, these variables seem to suggest that limits on youth access to tobacco
products are not effective in reducing youth cigarette smoking. While possible, it is more likely
that it is the relatively weak enforcement of these laws that leads to their apparent
ineffectiveness. For example, the relatively aggressively enforced minimum legal purchase ages
for alcoholic beverages have been shown to significantly reduce youth drinking, frequency of
drinking, heavy drinking, and related outcomes including drunken driving and motor vehicle
accident fatalities (Grossman, et al., 1994). As states begin to comply with the Synar
amendment requirements to demonstrate the effective enforcement of their laws limiting youth
access to tobacco products, these policies may prove effective in reducing youth smoking.
State laws providing some form of protection for smoking appear to have little impact
on the probability that a youth will smoke. However, these laws do have a positive and
statistical y significant impact on average daily cigarette consumption by young smokers. This
may be the result of the positive climate for smoking fostered by the laws.
Finally, the variable indicating states which have earmarked a portion of their tobacco
tax revenues for other tobacco control activities has a negative and stitisticall y significant impact
on both the probability that a youth will smoke and the average daily cigarette consumption of
young smokers. In these states, most notably California and Massachusetts, a substantial portion
of cigarette tax revenues are used for media and other educational anti-smoking efforts, much
of which target youths. These results suggest that the anti-smoking activities funded by tobacco
tax revenues are successful in reducing youth smoking. Given that this variable also reflects
relatively large cigarette excise tax increases and, consequently, is highly correlated with
cigarette prices, it may also be, in part, capturing the effects of large tax increases on youth
20cigarette demand. To some extent, this possibility is supported by the reduced magnitude of the
coefficients on the cigarette price in the models when the indicator of earmarking is included.
b. Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables
Young males are found to be much less likely to smoke but to
than young females, after controlling for other determinants of demand.
smoke more on average
Young blacks and other
non-white youths are much less likely to smoke and smoke significantly less than young whites,
with blacks least likely to smoke. Older youths are more likely to smoke and have higher
average daily cigarette consumption than younger youths. After controlling for age, eighth and
tenth grade youths are both more likely to smoke and to smoke more on average than twelfth
grade youths. a
Youths with higher real weekly incomes, either from employment or other sources, are
significantly more likely to smoke and smoke more on average than youths with lower incomes.
This positive relationship between income and smoking contrasts with much of the recent
empirical evidence which suggests that cigarette smoking is an economical y inferior behavior
for adults (i.e. Wasserman, et al., 1991). The estimated overall income elasticity of youth
cigarette demand is 0.294, with the estimated income elasticity of youth smoking participation
at 0.140 and the income elasticity of conditional demand at 0.154. Similarly, youths who work
more hours are much more likely to smoke and to smoke more on average than those who either
aThis variable is included to control for the fact that some of the other independent variables
were not collected in the surveys of eighth and tenth grade students (i.e. the marital status
variable).
21don’t work or work fewer hours.
Youths with a stronger attachment to religion, m measured by attendance at religious
services, are much less likely to smoke and smoke less on average than those with little or no
attachment. Smoking among youths in rural areas is significantly lower than smoking by youths
in non-rural areas.
With respect to family structure, youths living in a family where both parents are present
are least likely to smoke, while those who live alone are most likely to smoke. Engaged or
married youths are also significantly more likely to smoke than are unattached youths. Youths
with at least one sibling, however, are less likely to smoke and smoke significantly less on
average than only children. Youths whose mothers worked when they were growing up are
significantly more likely to smoke than youths whose mothers stayed home, with those whose
mothers worked full-time most likely to smoke. Finally, youth cigarette smoking is inversely
related to maternal and paternal education.
Finally, the prevalence of youth cigarette smoking is significantly higher in 1994 than
in either of the other years covered by these data. However, it appears that average cigarette
consumption by young smokers is falling from 1992 to 1994.
V. Discussion
The results described above indicate that tobacco control policies, including higher
cigarette excise taxes, can be effective in reducing youth cigarette smoking. In particular, the
average estimated overall price elasticity of cigarette demand of -1.313 indicates that large
22increases in cigarette excise taxes, by significantly raising price, would lead to sharp reductions
in youth smoking. For example, the Clinton Administration’s recent Health Security Act called
for a 75 cent per pack increase in the Federal cigarette excise tax to partially finance health care
reform. If this tax increase had been in effect during the period covered by these data (and had
been fully passed on to smokers), overall youth smoking would have been cut in half, while the
number of youth smokers would have fallen by about 25 percent. Indeed, the reductions in
youth smoking would be even larger if the price increase exceeded the tax increase as has been
the case for past Federal cigarette excise tax hikes (Harris, 1987; Keeler, et al., 1994; and Sung,
Hu, and Keeler, 1994).
These estimates are generally consistent with the earlier work on youth cigarette demand
by kwit and his colleagues (Lewit, Coate and Grossman, 1981); Grossman, et al., 1983). That
is, the estimated overall price elasticity of youth cigarette demand is well above the consensus
estimate for adults. Thus, these estimates suggest that substantial increases
taxes would lead to sharp reductions in youth smoking. Given that almost
in cigarette excise
no smokers begin
smoking after age 20 (USDHHS, 1994), large sustained increases in cigarette excise taxes are
among the most effective means of achieving substantial long-run improvements in health. For
example, the 75 cent= increase described above would reduce the number of smokers ages 12
through 18 years by roughly 1.8 million. Using the relatively conservative estimate that one in
four smokers dies prematurely from smoking related illnesses, these estimates imply that a real,
sustained 75 cent tax hike would reduce smoking related premature deaths in this cohort by
nearly 450,000. Similar, albeit smaller reductions, would occur in smoking prevalence and
smoking related premature deaths in less price sensitive older age cohorts.
23In addition, the finding that youths are relatively more price sensitive than adults has
important implications for the long-run revenue potential of increased cigarette excise taxes. If
the demand for cigarettes by youths and young adults was as sensitive to price m that of adults
(for whom the consensus estimates of the price elasticity center on -0.4), then increases in
cigarette taxes would be expected to generate substantial revenues in both the short and long-
runs. However, if youths and young adults are much more sensitive to price, as the estimates
above indicate, then sustained real increases in cigarette excise taxes will initially lead to large
increases in revenues (since the smoking population is dominated by relatively older smokers).
Eventually, the population will become dominated by people whose initial smoking decisions
were more sensitive to price, leading to relatively larger reductions in the number of smokers.9
Consequently, the revenues associated with a relatively large cigarette tax increase would rise
sharply in the short run, but would eventually decline over time. Nevertheless, given current
cigarette taxes and prices, the long-run revenue maximizing level of the tax is well above its
9The Congressional Research Service (CRS, 1994) provides a useful definition of the long-
run in its evaluation of the long run revenue effects of higher cigarette excise taxes. It defines
the long run as 69 years, which allows the 12 to 80 year old population (which includes nearly
all regular smokers) to fully adjust to changes in cigarette taxes.
In addition, the long-run revenue implications of higher cigarette taxes is complicated by
the addictive nature of cigarette smoking. Recent econometric studies accounting for the
addictive aspects of cigarette consumption (Becker, Grossman, and Murphy, 1994; Chaloupka,
1991) estimate a long run price elasticity about double their short run estimates. This is due to
the cumulative effect of a sustained increase in price on cigarette demand. If there is a
permanent increase in cigarette prices, then cigarette consumption in the current and all future
periods falls. However, given the addictive nature of consumption, future consumption also falls
as a result of the drop in current consumption. The long run, in this sense, is defined as the
period when consumption at all times fully responds to a permanent change in price (similar to
the 69 years used by the CRS).
24current level. 10
Additionally, the estimates presented above indicate that stronger restrictions on smoking
in public places lead to significant reductions in the prevalence of smoking among youths.
Further limits on smoking in schools are also found to be effective in reducing average daily
cigarette consumption among young smokers. However, limits on youth access to tobacco
products appear to have little impact on youth cigarette smoking, This is most likely the result
of the relatively weak enforcement of these laws. As the enforcement requirements of the Synar
amendment are implemented, the limits on youth access may prove effective in reducing youth
smoking.
10For example, breed on the Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) and Chaloupka (1991)
estimates, Grossman (1993) predicts that a Federal cigarette excise tax of $1.26 would have
maximize revenues. Similarly, Merriman (1994) concludes that, at least in 1985, cigarette taxes
in every state were well below their revenue maximizing levels.
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29Table One
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition, Mean (p), and Standard Deviation (u)
Smoking Dichotomousindicator equal to one if youth reports smoking in the
Participation past month, equal to zero otherwise. p =0.229, u= O.420
Cigarette Natural logarithm of average daily cigarette consumption, smokers
Consumption by only. p= O.744, u=l.439
Smokers
Real Cigarette Price Average price of a pack of twenty cigarettes, in centi, deflated by
the national Consumer Price Index, 1984-84=1.00. p= 124.756,
u= 13.564
Workplace Smoking Fraction of population in youth’s county of residence subject to
Restrictions state or local restrictions on smoking in private workplaces.
p= O.531, u= O.469
Restaurant Smoking Fraction of population in youth’s county of residence subject to
Restrictions state or local restrictions on smoking in restaurants. p =0.740,
U=O.417
Retail Smoking Fraction of population in youth’s county of residence subject to
Restrictions state or local restrictions on smoking in retail stores. P=0.644,
u= O.461
School Smoking Fraction of population in youth’s county of residence subject to
Restrictions state or local restrictions on smoking in schools. p =0.912,
u= O.281
Other Smoking Fraction of population in youth’s county of residence subject to
Restrictions any state or local restrictions on smoking, other than in private
workplaces, restauranfi, retail stores, or schools. p =0.927,
u=0,258
Minimum Purchase State minimum legal purchase age, in years, for tobacco producti.
Age P=18.161, u= O.684
Minimum Purchase Dichotomous indicator equal to one if the youth resides in a state
Age Sign Required requiring signs reflecting the minimum purchase age for tobacco
products be posted where these products are sold, equal to zero
otherwise. p =0.747, u= O.435
30Variable Definition, Mean (p), and Standard Deviation (u)
Vending Machine Fraction of population in youth’s county of residence subject to
Restrictions any state or local restrictions on the sale of tobacco products
through vending machines. p =0.748, a= O.422
Limits on Free Fraction of population in youth’s county of residence subject to
Sample Distribution any state or local restrictions on the distribution of free samples of
tobacco products. p= =0.566, u= O.491
Tobacco Licensing Fraction of population in youth’s county of residence in which a
Provisions license is required to sell tobacco products. p =0.922, u= O.268
Cigarette Tax Dichotomous indicator equal to one if the youth resides in a state
Earmarking earmarking a portion of cigarette tax revenues for other tobacco
control activities, equal to zero otherwise. p =0. 158, a=O. 365
Smoking Protection Dichotomous indicator equal to one if the youth resides in a state
with any smoking protection legislation, equal to zero otherwise.
p= O.476, u= O.499
Male Dichotomous indicator equal to one for males and zero for
females. p= O.481, u= O.500
Black Dichotomous indicator equal to one for blacks and zero otherwise.
p= O.116, u= O.321
Other Race Dichotomous indicator equal to one for individuals who are not
black or white and zero otherwise. p =0.208, u= O.406
Age Age, in years. p=16.100, u=l.823
Infrequent Religious Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths who attend
Attendance religious services infrequently and zero otherwise. p =0.486,
fJ=om500
Frequent Religious Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths who attend religous
Attendance services frequently and zero otherwise. p =0.383, a=O. 486
Rural Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths in rural
communities and zero otherwise. p =0.269, u= O.444
Live Alone Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths who live alone and
zero otherwise. p =0.004, u= O.062
Father Only Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths in families with the
father the only parent present and zero otherwise. p =0,034,
a=O. 181
31Variable Definition, Mean (p), and Standard Deviation (a)
Mother Only Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths in families with the
mother the only parent present and zero otherwise. p =0. 155,
u= O.362
Other Family Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths in families with
Structure neither parent present and zero otherwise. p =0.029, u=O. 169
Siblings Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths with at least one
sibling and zero otherwise. p =0.762, CJ=O.426
Father hss Than Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths with fathers who
High School did not graduate from high school and zero otherwise. p =0. 135,
Graduate U=O.345
Father More Than Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youth with fathers who
High School have more than a high school education and zero otherwise.
Graduate p= O.576, a= O.494
Mother Less Than Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths with mothers who
High School did not graduate from high school and zero otherwise. p=0.123,
Graduate u= O.328
Mother More Than Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youth with mothers who
High School have more than a high school education and zero otherwise.
Graduate p=o.551, U=O.497
Not Single Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths who are either
married or engaged and zero otherwise. p =0.023, u=O.151
Mother Worked Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths whose mothers
Part-time worked part-time while they were growing up and zero otherwise.
p= O.218, a= O.413
Mother Worked Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths whose mothers
Full-time worked full-time while they were growing up and zero otherwise.
p= O.578, u= O.494
Average Hours Average hours worked weekly for pay. p =7.025, u=9.641
Worked
Real Weekly Average weekly income, in dollars, from employment and other
Income sources, deflated by the national Consumer Price Index, 1982-
84=1. p=31.533, u=35.184
Grade 8 or 10 Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths surveyed in the
eighth/tenth grade survey and zero otherwise. p =0.689, u= O.463
32IIVariable Definition, Mean @), and Standard Deviation (u)
Year= 1993 Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths surveyed in 1993
and zero otherwise. P=0.339, p =0.473
Year =1994 Dichotomous indicator equal to one for youths surveyed in 1994
and zero otherwise. p =0.336, u= O.472
Note to Table One: Sample size is 110,717.
33Table Two
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34Notes to Table Two: t-ratios are in parentheses. Each row represents a different specification
which, in addition to price and the tobacco related policy noted in that row, includes: an
intercept, indicators of gender, race, age, religiosity, rural residence, family structure, parental
education, maternal work status, grade and year, and continuous measures of average hours
worked and real income. The results for these variables are available upon request.
35Table Three
Estimates from Two-Part Models of Youth Cigarette Demand
Full Model
Cigarette consumption




Real Cigarette Price (-4.66) (-3.80)
-0.054 -0.016
Workplace Smoking Restrictions (-3.87) (-0.57)
-0.003 0.117
Restaurant Smoking Restrictions (-o. 13) (2.82)
-0.023 -0.025
Retail Smoking Restrictions (-1.07) (-0.60)
0.024 -0.093
School Smoking Restrictions (1.32) (-2.62)
-0.030 -0.099
Other Smoking Restrictions (-1.39) (-2.30)
0.038 0.058
Minimum Legal Purchase Age (3.50) (2.72)
-0.014 0.028
Minimum Purchase Age Sign Required (-1.11) (2.53)
0.029 0.010
Vending Maching Restrictions (2.05) (0.35)
-0.010 -0.032
Limits on Free Sample Distribution (-0.99) (-1.58)
0.023 -0.008
Tobacco Licensing Provisions (1.29) (-0.24)
-0.110 -0.117
Cigmette Tax Earmarking (-6,57) (-3.49)
0.007 0.056












Infrequent Religious Attendance (-12.16) (-16.72)
-0.477 -0.633
Frequent Religious Attendance (-34.77) (-23.70)
-0.026 -0.042
Rural (-2.51) (-2. 10)
0.338 0.643
Live Alone (5.27) (6.21)
0.208 0.228
Father Only (9.08) (5.49)
0.118 0.154
Mother Only (9.42) (6.43)
0.177 0.327




Father Less Than High School Graduate (4.82) (4. 17)
Father More Than High School -0.029 -0.115
Graduate (-2.68) (-5.46)
Mother Less Than High School 0.051 0.042
Graduate (3.37) (1.48)
Mother More Than High School -0.025 -0.081
Graduate (-2.40) (-4.02)
0.047 0.397
Not Single (2.94) (8.27)
0.026 -0.054
Mother Worked Part-time (1.97) (-4.02)
37Cigarette consumption
Independent Variables Smoking Participation by smokers
0.052 0.029
Mother Worked Full-time (4,59) (1.28)
0.006 0.007
Average Hours Worked (9.66) (6.09)
0.004 0.004
Real Weekly Income (22.21) (13.00)
0.131 0.230
Grade80r 10 (7.68) (6.97)
0.002 -0.030
Year = 1993 (o. 15) (-1.29)
0.051 -0.070
Year = 1994 (3.57) (-2.48)
Note to Table Three: t-ratios are in parentheses.
38Table Four
Estimated Price Elasticities of Youth Cigarette Demand
Panel A: Full Sample
Smoking Cigarette Total Price
Participation Consumption by Elasticity of Youth
Smokers Cigarette Demand
Price Only Model -0.799 -0.651 -1.450
Full Model -0.376 -0.470 -0.846
Panel B: Restricted Sample
Smoking Cigarette Total Price
Participation Consumption by Elasticity of Youth
Smokers Cigarette Demand
Price Only Model -0.923 -0.779 -1.702
Full Model -0.602 -0.652 -1.254
Note to Table Four: The price elasticities for the restricted sample are based on estimates of
models comparable to those contained in Tables Two and Three. The estimates for these models
are available upon request. The sample size for the restricted sample is 75,090 respondents,